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Section 1.  Introduction 
 
The present study is part of a wider research project concerned with enhancing 
understanding of the non-farm rural economy in India and Central and Eastern 
European countries. 2  The research has been undertaken by the Natural Resources 
Institute, United Kingdom, and local partners, with funding from the UK’s 
Department for International Development under a collaborative agreement with the 
World Bank. Special emphasis has been given to understanding the factors that enable 
households to access non-farm employment and income opportunities, including the 
establishment and development of small businesses.  
 
Enterprises worldwide need a broad range of support services for their development. 
These include training and capacity building, technical assis tance in productive 
investment, consultancy and promotional programmes, business information, network 
development, marketing, and links with strategic partners. As a group, these products 
have been named Business Development Services (BDS). 
 
The diversity of BDS is also reflected in the wide range of BDS providers, which 
exist around the world. They can be government agencies, international donors, 
NGOs, chambers of commerce, universities, business associations, private 
foundations, as well as informal social networks embedded in inter- firm linkages. 
There are also specific institutional arrangements established between these various 
agents, which can increase effectiveness in providing BDS. 
 
This paper reviews the international experience of institutional approaches to the 
delivery of BDS, by drawing on twenty case studies from Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and Western and Eastern Europe. It highlights the main strengths and weaknesses of a 
number of institutional arrangements, and identifies some general guidelines that seek 
to contribute towards improved national policies on enterprise development and BDS 
provision. The study is organised as follows: section 2 presents the emerging new 
paradigm in BDS philosophy; section 3 analyses three institutional BDS-delivery 
models: (1) the delivery of services through government agencies, i.e. government-
driven approach; (2) the forging of partnerships between donors and national 
institutions; and (3) the promotion of independent BDS providers such as business 
centres, clusters and networks, and business incubators.; and section 4 offers some 
conclusions on emerging best practice for BDS development.   
 
 
Section 2.  BDS Market Development – The New Paradigm 
 
Traditionally, BDS to small enterprises have been delivered with the support of donor 
and government subsidies. Particularly in developing countries, the approach has been 
to subsidise the cost of BDS to final users, with the premise that small enterprises 
cannot afford to pay full costs. The strategy has usually been to start up BDS 
programmes within government organisations, which provide services deemed to be 
appropriate for the target population, based on broad surveys of needs. To secure 
continuous availability of services, the provision of subsidies was expected to be 
permanent. In many cases, this traditional approach resulted in supply-driven BDS 
delivery (not suitable to enterprises’ needs); low impact on businesses’ productivity 
                                                 
2 For details, see the Rural Non-Farm Economy (RNFE) project website at www.nri.org/rnfe  
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and growth; and financially unsustainable BDS providers (Goldmark 1996). Partly as 
a consequence of these unintended effects, a new perspective is emerging. 
 
The new paradigm in BDS delivery calls for the development of markets, rather than 
that of individual institutions alone. This signifies a shift in thinking from subsidised 
supply- led BDS provision to market-determined demand-driven services, where both 
sides of the market, demand and supply, are helped to develop (Steel et al 2000, 
Gibson, Hitchins and Bear 2001). Figure 1 presents graphically the core principles of 
the new approach. The starting point is an emphasis on clearly understanding the 
constraints that prevent suppliers from satisfying the demand for BDS, as well as the 
obstacles that restrain consumers from making their demand explicit. In the diagram, 
we can see that BDS suppliers may not provide for small enterprises due to, amongst 
other factors, limited information about this clientele, deficient staff skills, 
inappropriate products, and inefficient organisational structures. On the demand side, 
users may be constrained by limited or distorted understanding about their own 
needs/problems, limited resources and capabilities to assess market-based services 
and to determine whether these represent value for money, and business 
environmental factors such as the expectation to receive free or heavily subsidised 
services.    
    
            
 
 
Once it is understood why markets fail to be effective, the new approach identifies 
strategies to help develop them. To help suppliers overcome barriers, proponents of 
the new thinking advise interventions (by donors and governments) concentrating on 
assisting BDS providers with technical knowledge and training, and helping them 
develop new products and venture finance. To promote demand for BDS, 
interventions are recommended which focus on raising consumers’ awareness about 
existing services, and on helping them with vouchers and matching grants to purchase 
BDS from local suppliers. In either case, subsidies are expected to be temporary and 
directed to facilitate market development rather than to distort BDS prices. More 
specifically, figure 2 shows where interventions could be less invasive. 
BDS Providers BDS Consumers
Constrained by: Constrained by:
Limited information Limited information
about markets opportunities about problems or solutions
Skill deficiencies Valuation problems
technical or business affecting willingness to pay
Operational constrains Limited resources
systems, structures to assess services
Inappropriate products Environment
Environments subsidies distorts 
barriers to activities willingness to pay
Figure 1. Matching market analysis to intervention options
Source: Gibson, Hitchins and Bear (2001)
Intervention options
Business linkages
Demand side   
Vouchers             
Matching grants     
Information
Supply side      
Product development       
Venture finance 
Technical Assistance 
Training
EFFECTIVE 
MARKET   
Demand=supply
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In the continual process of BDS provision, three phases can be observed: (a) the pre-
delivery stage, i.e. where ideas and products are developed, organisations 
strengthened, and information advertised to potential clients; (b) the delivery phase, 
where product transactions take place between suppliers and consumers; and (c) the 
post-delivery stage, where assessment of markets and products are made. The new 
approach, as presented in figure 2, identifies the pre- and post-delivery phases as less 
invasive interventions.  However, intervening at the delivery stage is shown as highly 
invasive, due to the potentially distorting effect on market prices and, hence, on 
willingness to pay on the part of consumers and on the motivation to become 
competitive on the part of suppliers. With these issues in mind, we now turn to 
analysing some of the various institutional arrangements that have been implemented 
in the delivery of BDS, worldwide.  
 
 
Section  3.  Institutional Approaches to the Delivery of BDS – A 
Review of the International Experience  
 
The international experience of delivering BDS has been diverse and complex. Our 
analysis of this experience revolves around twenty case studies drawn from developed 
and developing countries. These examples are representative of three distinct 
institutional approaches to BDS provision: (1) the delivery of services through 
government agencies, i.e. government-driven approach; (2) the forging of partnerships 
between donors and national institutions; and (3) the promotion of independent BDS 
providers such as business centres, clusters and networks, and business incubators. 
Table 1 lists our twenty case studies grouped in accordance to the type of institutional 
arrangement they best represent. The country, programme and organisation involved 
are cited as well as the main source of information.  
 
Post
Delivery
less invasive
Figure 2. Where interventions are less invasive
more invasive
Information 
for BDS 
users
Delivery 
supply-side
Delivery 
demand-side
Assessment of 
markets/ 
products
Ideas
Developing 
products
Developing 
people and 
organisations
Advertising 
and product 
positioning
Source: Gibson, Hitchins and Bear (2001)
Feedback and change
Pre-delivery phase Delivery
less invasive
Minimum 
potential for 
distortion
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The analysis which is presented in this section aims at assessing the comparative 
performance of the selected programmes and those institutional arrangements 
established for the delivery of BDS. 
 
 
3.1.  The Government-Driven Approach 
 
Governments in developed and developing countries have been active agents in the 
provision of BDS, delivering services directly to the target population or through the 
fostering of linkages with relevant organisations. This government-driven approach is 
characterised primarily by its intention to achieve national goals, such as higher 
employment, rapid industrialisation, and better export competitiveness in international 
markets. Our four case studies (see Table 2) provide some insights into the advantages 
and disadvantages of this model. 
 
 
 
3.1.1  Services and extent of coverage 
 
With strong political will, government- led BDS programmes have the potential to 
reach large numbers of beneficiaries at the local level. In Italy, for instance, the 
Table 1. Institutional approaches to the delivery of BDS: Case studies 
A. Government-driven approach
Country Programme/institution Main source (1)
Denmark National network project Hatch, 1988
India SIDBI Sinha, 2000
Italy North-central small firms Brusco, 1986
United Kingdom SEEDA www.seeda.co.uk
B. Donor partnership with national institutions
Country Programme/institution Main source (1)
Bangladesh ITDG www.itdgbangladesh.org
Brazil EMPRETEC Ruffing and Farinelli, 1999
Ghana EMPRETEC Gibson, 2000
Senegal FSP Levitsky, 2000
Sri Lanka Sarvodaya www.swwb.org
Uruguay EMPRETEC Ruffing and Farinelli, 1999
Zimbabwe EWW Loucks, 2000
C. Independent providers
Country/region Programme/institution Main source (1)
Brazil Business incubators Lalkaka et al, 2000
Central America UNIDO Ceglie and Dini, 1999
India UNIDO Russo et al, 2000
Latin America EDC Garcia, 2000
Philippines Swisscontact Gibson and Hitchins, 2000
Romania Business centres Kennedy et al, 2000
Russia Volkhov Schmertz, 2000
Russia Business centres Astrakhan, 1999
Zimbabwe Manicaland Grierson et al, 2000
(1) See reference list.
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promotion of networks of small firms in the north-central part of the country helped 
improve the region dramatically, transforming ordinary enterprise clusters into solid 
industrial districts capable of competing in global markets (Brusco 1986). The  
successful experience in Italy inspired other countries in Europe, of which perhaps the 
best-known example is the Danish national network project, launched in 1989. Rather 
than focussing on specific localities, this project emphasised the provision of services 
to small manufacturing firms all over the country. Significant government financial 
support was then allocated to the formation of networks, which, in turn, created the 
necessary ‘critical mass’ for Danish companies to compete successfully in a 
liberalised European market (Hatch 1988).3 
 
In India, meanwhile, the government programme is not restricted to the cluster model 
and it provides services at both local and national levels. Table 5 shows the range of 
services and coverage. Being a major national financial institution, SIDBI combines 
credit with BDS to promote micro-enterprise development, and delivers these services 
through NGOs and local institutions, as well as through its own offices. Some 
services have been more successful than others. For example, the Marketing Fund has 
been instrumental in helping rural handicraft enterprises in various parts of the 
country to find urban markets, and facilitated marketing links between large honey 
traders in Mumbai with small rural producers in Bihar. However, the Rural Industries 
Programme has in general generated negligible value added (Sinha 2000).        
 
SEEDA in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, focuses on a specific local area, 
the South East of England, and has been successful predominantly in forging linkages 
between businesses and universities in the region for the delivery of BDS. A 
particular strength lies in their ability to form partnerships with private and public 
institutions, which complement one another for the provision of appropriate BDS to 
local businesses. For instance, there are effective links with two local government 
organisations: the Government Office for the South East, which represents the 
government in a wide range of issues, and the South East England Regional 
Assembly, which is the local democratic voice of the region (SEEDA 2003).  
 
 
3.1.2  Market distortions  
 
One drawback of the government-driven approach is the distortions it can cause to 
market prices and the provision of BDS by the private sector. As services are 
delivered, in most cases, in a highly subsidised manner, prices are lower than those 
determined by market forces. This creates distortions in both the demand for and the 
supply of BDS. On the demand side, beneficiaries began to expect free or cheap 
services even when they have the capacity to pay. On the supply side, subsidised BDS 
effectively crowds out private sector provision of these services, resulting in overall 
market inefficiency: i.e. substitution of private-sector provision for unsustainable 
public-sector supply of BDS. 
                                                 
3 The particular strengths and weaknesses of the cluster or network approach are presented in some 
detail in section 3.3, where discussion of the independent model is provided. 
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Italy Denmark SEEDA        
United Kingdom
SIDBI India
Foundation date Early 1980s 1989 1999 1990
Institutional Linkages
Horizontal links 
among SMEs and 
vertical links with 
large firms 
Networks among 
small businesses
Links between 
businesses and 
universities
Formal 
commercial banks. 
NGOs
Business Development 
Services
Promotion of small 
enterprise 
networks
Challenge grants 
for networks, 
information, 
brokers' training
Development of 
skills, business 
competitiveness, 
and innovation
Technology, 
credit, skill 
development
Target Clientele
Emilia Romagna 
and others in 
North-central Italy
SMEs with 6-99 
employees
Businesses in the 
South East of 
England
SMEs and micro-
enterprises
Financial sources Government 
support
Ministry Trade and 
Industry
Three government 
departments
Mainly public 
sector
Performance level
Sharp rise in 
wealth and fall in 
unemployment
Higher exports & 
competitiveness in 
Europe
Positive impact on 
business 
development
Cost recovery 
below 35%
Sources: Brusco (1986); Hatch (1988);  www.seeda.co.uk; Sinha (2000).
Table 2. Government-driven approach
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EMPRETEC 
Uruguay
EMPRETEC 
Brazil
EWW Zimbabwe
ITDG 
Bangladesh
Sarvodaya   Sri 
Lanka
FSP Senegal
EMPRETEC 
Ghana 
Foundation date 1989 1991 1996 1990 1958 1996 1990
Institutional Linkages Public-owned 
bank
SEBRAE 
national org for 
SMEs
Manufacturers 
and distributors 
Foreign buyers 
via donors' 
contacts
Network of 
village 
organisations
Private 
consultancies & 
consultants
Developed into a 
private 
foundation
Business Development 
Services
Enterpreneur-
ship,training, 
consulting
Enterpreneur-
ship,training, 
consulting
Marketing, 
technology 
transfer, mgmt
Marketing, 
technology, 
social dev
Training, 
technology, 
social dev
Diagnostic, 
advisory and 
training services
Training, 
consultancy, 
credit, forum
Target Clientele Upper-end of 
SMEs 
Small and micro 
businesses
Small-scale 
producers, 
mainly agricult
Micro-enterprises        
(< 5 people)
Self-employed in 
non-farm 
activities
SMEs, 
employers' 
organisations
High-growth-
potential SMEs, 
banks
Financial sources
30% external 
subsidies, 30% 
fees, 30% 
partner
3% from UNDP, 
97% from 
SEBRAE
Few market-
based fees. 
Donor support
Donor support. 
Some fees from 
clients
Donor dependent
Loans from IDA, 
some clients' 
fees
Negotiated fee 
from donors. 
Clients' fees
Performance level
Good. Main 
source of BDS in 
the country
Positive impact 
on clients. 
Some cost 
recovery (direct 
costs). High 
outreach
High outreach 
into the poor. 
Some cost 
recovery
High poverty-
reduction impact. 
Not self-
sustained
Lack of reach to 
smaller SMEs.  
High subsidies.
Good financially. 
But outreach to 
SMEs is low  
                   For Sarvodaya: www.swwb.org/ For ITDG-Bangladesh: www.itdgbangladesh.org/
Sources:   Ruffing and Farinelly (1999), Levitsky (2000), Loucks (2000), Gibson (2000). 
Table 3. Donor partnership with national institutions 
Public sector NGO Private sector
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Swisscontact 
Philippines
Romanian 
Centres
EDC Latin 
America
Business 
Centres in 
Russia
UNIDO Central 
America
UNIDO India Manicaland 
Zimbabwe
Incubators in 
Brazil
Volkhov Russia
Foundation 
date
1996 1994-5 1995-6 1993 1993 1995 1995 1984 1995
Institutional 
Linkages
Local Chambers 
of Commerce
Gov agencies, 
NGOs, private 
and public 
institutions
Intermediary of 
private consult-
ants, chamber of 
industry.
Universities, 
colleges, and 
training 
organisations
Firms, buyers, 
suppliers, and 
support 
institutions 
Local gvt, 
NGOs, banks, 
producers' 
assoc, univers
Pro-profit buyers 
and suppliers
SEBRAE, 
universities, 
private sector
Local gov, 
financial 
institutions and 
private sector
Business 
Development 
Services
Training, legal, 
wholesale 
purchasing, 
credit services
Information, 
business 
counseling, 
loans, training 
Training, 
information and 
technical 
assistance
Business adm, 
industrial 
management 
information
Joint training, 
organisational 
and productive 
capabilities
Strengthen 
interactions, 
project dev, 
SME demand
"Buyer mento-
ring", help with 
access to credit
Work space, 
facilities, 
training, advice
Production 
space, training, 
counselling, 
credit
Target Clientele SMEs with 5-50 
employees
Upper end of 
SMEs & some 
larger ones
SMEs of 5-99 
employees
Initially SMEs, 
then clients with 
ability to pay for 
service
SMEs Small-scale 
enterprises
Large and small 
businesses
Early-stage firms
Micro-
enterprises, 
especially 
women
Financial 
sources
Support from 
Swiss donors; 
clients' fees
Donor start-up 
support. Local 
subsidies, fees, 
income
55%-75% from 
IADB; rest from 
client fees
USAID for 3.5 
years; then 
clients' fees & 
own income
Combination of 
private and 
public sources
Italian and Swiss 
donor agencies
Confederation of 
Zimbabwe 
Industries
52% public 
subsidies, 40% 
private sources
USAID for 3 yrs, 
clients fees, 
income
Performance 
level
Cost recovery: 
between 37% 
and  50%
Near financial 
sustainability but 
less outreach
Financial 
sustainability is 
major aim
Self-sufficient. 
No service to 
start-up micro-
enterprises
Some cost 
recovery; high 
outreach to small 
bussiness
Improved trust & 
effective de-
mand for BDS
Strongly in cost 
recovery; low 
outreach
Not self-
sufficient; good 
impact
Aiming at cost 
recovery; high 
impact effects
                 Lalkaka and Shaffer (2000), Levistky (2000), Russo et al (2000), Schmertz (2000), and Sinha (2000).  
Sources: Astrakhan (1999), Ceglie and Dini (1999), Garcia et al (2000), Gibson (2000), Gibson and Hitchins (2000), Grierson et al (2000), Kennedy et al (2000),  
Table 4. Independent models 
Business Centres Clusters / Linkages Business Incubators
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Table 5. SIDBI’s business services for micro enterprises 
 
Service Description Coverage Provided by 
Rural Industries 
Programme (RIP) 
Comprehensive enterprise 
development services and 
business counselling 
Usually  
1-3 
districts 
Professional business 
consultancy or non-profit 
development agency (NGO) 
Entrepreneurship 
Development 
Programmes 
Training for development of 
entrepreneurship skills  
Provincial 
or sub-
provincial 
Publicly funded 
entrepreneurship promotion 
agency or NGO 
Technology Fund Finances for technology 
transfer or technical skill 
development 
Provincial 
or sub-
provincial 
SIDBI branch office usually 
under advice from RIP 
agency 
Marketing Fund Finances for marketing or 
market support initiatives 
National SIDBI Marketing Finance and 
Development Department 
Skill-cum-Technology 
Up gradation 
Programme 
Technical skill development 
and technology transfer 
Local or 
sub-
provincial 
Local institutes responsible 
for technology adaptation 
transfer 
Cluster Technology Up 
gradation Programme 
Environment/pollution 
technology related services to 
clusters of enterprises  
Local or 
sub-
provincial 
Technical consultants  
Source: Sinha (2000) 
 
 
 
3.1.3  Changing mindsets of government officials 
 
A fundamental constraint to improving the delivery of government-led BDS arises 
from the insufficiently businesslike perspectives of public-sector officials. In India, 
for instance, a re-orientation from the mindset of risk-averse programme ‘controllers’ 
to entrepreneurial ‘innovation catalysts’ would help enhance the performance of BDS 
programmes and yield substantial benefits to micro enterprises. To this end, some key 
skills requirements for service providers are recommended (Sinha 2000:289): 
 
· An ability to undertake microeconomic feasibility analysis 
· Knowledge of the target sub-sectors and the availability of basic technologies 
within them 
· Understanding of financial issues and appraisal requirements of banks 
· Basic management skills and appreciation of the practical realities of business 
administration 
· Exposure to and understanding of the needs of markets 
· An analytical approach to production/productivity and quality issues 
· A concern for environmental issues 
 
In other countries, the emphasis has been placed on setting up training courses to 
improve the entrepreneurial skills of government officials and young people who, in 
the future, may join the civil service. Examples of these innovative projects are 
presented in Box 1.  
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Box 1: Enhancing Entrepreneurial Skills in the Public Sector and Amongst the Youth 
EMPRETEC, in Uruguay, has implemented a number of projects, which seek to enhance the 
entrepreneurial skills of public-sector officials and young people.   
Initiative Project (1996-1998). This is an entrepreneurship development programme aiming at promo -
ting the modernization of public enterprises. Around 1000 executives of major State enterprises have 
been trained, with the purpose of enhancing their entrepreneurial spirit. The follow-up assistance on a 
one-to-one basis has involved 350 participants, and lasted an average of nine months. As an outcome, 
64 % have designed an individual Action Plan, and 53 % have reached the new pre-established goals 
(behavioural changes). The participants evaluated the programme with a score of 10 out of 12. 
CEPRE Project: Re -orienting civil servants  (1997-1998). Since 1997 EMPRETEC-Uruguay has 
provided assistance to 200 civil servants working in the Public Administration. Among these, 95% not 
only changed their mindsets towards business, but also created new enterprises and obtained loans from 
ad-hoc allocated public funds. The participants evaluated the programme as very beneficial. 
Catal ysis Project (1994-1998). It is a UNDP financed project aimed at consolidating the high-tech 
profile of selected enterprises and at stimulating entrepreneurial /innovative behaviours among 
university graduates. An ad hoc follow up involved 25 high-tech enterprises, and lasted four years. As 
an outcome, these enterprises have founded an association, called Catalysis; have been able to interact 
locally and internationally as a group, generating new synergies and implementing common technology 
upgrading plans; have participated in public and private bidding both locally and internationally; have 
won several National Quality Prizes. 
"Projoven" Project. The Ministry of Education has assigned to EMPRETEC-Uruguay the task of 
implementing a pilot project for supporting young entrepreneurs. Since June 1998, 15 companies 
initiated by young people under 25, and located outside Montevideo, have been assisted. 
 Source: Ruffing and Farinelli (1999)  
 
These projects aim at creating a business-oriented perspective within pub lic-sector 
agencies and actors, in order to enable them to implement BDS programmes, which 
could be more market-driven and hence more productive. Further analysis of this 
important issue is made in the next two sections.    
 
 
3.2.   Donor partnership with national institutions  
 
In the programmes covered by this study, the partnerships that are fostered between 
donors and national institutions are aimed at delivering services through an existing 
local institution rather than through the creation of new BDS providers, or via direct 
delivery by international donors. Recent experience in developing countries shows 
that there are three types of organisation that become donor partners: public sector 
bodies, NGOs, and private sector institutions. 
 
3.2.1  Public sector   
 
Partnership programmes with public sector organisations seek to benefit from the 
nationwide coverage of these institutions, with the expectation of correspondingly  
high levels of outreach of BDS delivery. The EMPRETEC 4  programme is an 
outstanding example of this model. It started in 1988, in Argentina, and is currently 
                                                 
4 See also www.empretec.net 
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being coordinated by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). A 
decade later, the EMPRETEC programme was operating in 10 African and Latin 
American countries with varying degree of success: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Our cases 
studies are the programmes implemented in Brazil and Uruguay (see Table 3). Some 
key issues highlight the strengths and weaknesses of these types of associations. 
 
Forming strategic partnerships 
 
An important aspect of the partnership approach is the ability to form strategic 
alliances with the public sector. In Brazil, EMPRETEC identified a well-established 
BDS organisation: SEBRAE, Service for Support to Micro and Small Business, is the 
largest national organisation in Brazil that specialises in providing services for SMEs. 
By being fully integrated into this public institution, EMPRETEC is able to offer its 
services to a network of 548 decentralised units, located in all state capitals and the 
most important cities in Brazil (Ruffing and Farinelli 1999).  
In Uruguay, the local partner is one of the largest state-owned banks in the country: 
the Banco de la República Oriental de Uruguay. The added value in this partnership is 
that the national bank provides office space, at no charge, for the administration and 
implementation of EMPRETEC’s training and consulting activities. In other Latin 
American countries, such as Chile and Colombia, major national organisations have 
also been involved (Levitsky 2000). The advantages of operating in well-known and 
consolidated structures are mainly twofold: reduced overhead costs and larger 
economies of scale. The disadvantages, however, relate to low visibility of the 
EMPRETEC programme (as the better-known partner gets most of the attention), and 
a tendency to apply a supply-driven approach.  
Some key criteria have been identified for the forming of good partnerships: 
· High credibility of the local institution: The partner organisation has to have a 
proven capability to operate as an active agent of change, and to be an 
influential institution in the country. 
· Provision of complementary services: The services that the partner institution 
offers should complement those supplied by the BDS programme, and should 
be integrated with each other so that entrepreneurs’ needs are more effectively 
met. 
· Business-oriented approach: Directors and managers of the national 
organisation should be very familiar with private sector dynamics, and should 
aim at enhancing private enterprise development. 
· Effective Advisory Board: Members of the Board should represent equally the 
institutions that constitute the partnership. For instance, in Uruguay, the board 
of directors is composed of eleven non-remunerated members, who are high-
level representatives of the finance sector, the chambers of commerce and 
industry, major universities, the central government, and international and 
bilateral cooperation agencies (Ruffing and Farinelli 1999). 
Facilitating business linkages at the national and international level 
 
The possibility of enhanced outreach is another advantage of these donor-public-
sector partnerships. Due to association with well-connected national institutions, the 
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EMPRETEC programme has been able to facilitate its clientele with linkages to 
national and international networks of small entrepreneurs, and to promote regional 
centres. For example, in cooperation with SEBRAE and the Banco de la República, 
EMPRETEC-Uruguay has established a local "balçao" (Centre for Enterprises) that 
provides networking services between Uruguayan and Brazilian enterprises. 
 
Behind this goal of promoting national and international linkages, is the intention to 
support long-term sustainable assistance to SMEs. This means that small enterprises 
are provided with services from their start-up stage of development up until they reach 
a sufficient scale to gain access to international markets. Initial training is hence 
reinforced by constant contact with similar enterprises in national and international 
networks and trade fairs.  
 
Defining the role of government agencies 
 
A common danger in these types of partnerships, however, is the potentially 
detrimental control that government agencies can exert ove r the programme. In 
Nigeria and Venezuela, for example, UNCTAD claims that government organisations 
have intervened excessively through selection of staff and beneficiaries, making the 
EMPRETEC programme less successful in achieving its aims (Levitsky 2000). 
 
Equally, it is difficult to determine the degree of influence that donors should wield 
over local governments, in the selection of members of the advisory board, and in the 
internal decisions of the board. Methods to overcome disproportionate influence by 
partners are difficult to identify and depend on individual cases and contexts. 
Nevertheless, it seems advisable that the involvement of government agencies should, 
in principle, be limited to the tasks of advisory and supportive activities. 
 
 
3.2.2  Non-governmental organisations  
 
The system of delivering BDS through NGOs aims to achieve depth of outreach. This 
means that the objective is not only to have high coverage of the target clientele but 
also, and perhaps most importantly, to reach the poorer segments of these populations. 
Our three case studies are representative of a large number of NGOs that manage 
BDS programmes in developing countries. Although some major benefits derive from 
this kind of institutional arrangement, a number of drawbacks exist.  
 
Ability to reach the poor and most vulnerable 
 
Compared to other types of partnerships, NGOs target potential clients at the poorer 
end of the income spectrum. EWW in Zimbabwe, for instance, aims at reaching 
small-scale producers, mainly in agriculture; ITDG in Bangladesh works with micro-
enterprises of less than five employees; and Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka provides for the 
poor self-employed in non-farm activities (Loucks 2000). The mission of these NGOs 
is hence primarily focussed on helping alleviate poverty. 
 
With such an ambitious institutional mission, NGOs generally seek to provide BDS 
within a broader range of services, including those that lead to the enhancement of 
women’s empowerment and the strengthening of social development. Sarvodaya is a 
case in point. It implements two so-called empowerment programmes, one of which 
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deals with spiritual, moral, cultural and political empowerment; and the other covers 
social, economic and technological empowerment. The economic empowerment 
programme includes the development of rural enterprises and the delivery of BDS. 
The NGO has a service network of 2,150 village organisations, and its impact on the 
target clientele are considered highly positive. 
 
Limited financial sustainability 
 
The issue of NGO financ ial sustainability (i.e. independent from donor support) 
remains unresolved. Despite efforts to recover costs, none of our selected case studies 
have attained self-sufficiency. In many instances, the need for cost recovery is 
considered more a constraint than an institutional objective (Loucks 2000:84). 
However, there are a few mechanisms that are helping NGOs to work towards self-
reliance: 
 
· Market-based services: EWW Zimbabwe, for example, has introduced a 
profitable tool-hire service which not only is provided at market-based prices, 
but also serves as a magnet to draw in active artisans for other BDS such as 
product and skill development. 
· Build on existing facilities: As Sarvodaya has a network of over 2,000 village 
organisations, their regular monthly meetings have been used as venues to 
announce and launch new programmes. In this way, costs have been reduced 
significantly, and new projects have been introduced effectively. 
· Clear financial plan: In order to make progress on financial sustainability, 
some NGOs have set up clear financial plans wherein strict timetables are 
fixed for phasing out donor subsidies over an agreed period of time. 
 
The majority of NGOs are also currently developing indicators to assess their degree 
of cost effectiveness and financ ial sustainability. 
 
The importance of management information systems 
 
Development of effective management information systems are still at an early stage 
in most NGOs, although progress has been considerable. As many NGOs are 
voluntary organisations, staff turnover is generally high and skills to develop 
management systems are inadequate. For the development of management 
information systems, some basic elements are required: computerised software for 
financial planning; regular data collection of pre-determined indicators; and personnel 
with skills in financial analysis and social impact assessment. With regard to 
indicators, NGOs have compiled a list of key variables (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Indicators used by NGOs in BDS project monitoring and evaluation 
 
 Cost effectiveness Impact Sustainability 
Local delivery 
organisation 
· Costs of services  
· Gross/net profits 
· Workload per staff 
· Mgmt/staff ratios 
· Overhead rates 
· Client profile 
· No. of clients 
· No. of BDS 
· No. of staff 
· New BDS products  
· Clientele growth 
· Fee revenue 
· Grants, endowment 
· Profitability/surplus 
· Cost reductions 
Client · Operating margins 
· Value added 
· Assets  
· New technology 
· New mgmt practices 
· New product lines 
· Debt/equity ratio 
· Net income 
· New product gains 
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· Local sourcing 
· Cost reductions 
· New delivery lines 
· New funding sources  
· Gross revenues  
· Household income 
Society/ economy · Less subsidies  
· Businesses created 
· Lower prices 
· Better salaries 
· Jobs created 
· Production growth 
· Service supply 
· Higher employment 
· Higher investment 
· New products  
· Savings in exchange 
· Higher local staff 
· Larger clientele 
· Higher value added 
· Rapid expansion 
Source: Adapted from Loucks (2000), Table 6.2.      
 
These indicators aim at helping assess the performance of local delivery 
organisations, their clients, and the society at large, in relation to cost-effectiveness, 
impact and sustainability. Most variables are quantitative measures, which are easy to 
calculate when data collection is regular and consistent. Other variables, however, can 
be qualitative in nature, especially when assessment of gender equity, environmental 
sustainability, and indigenous-group participation are included. Generally speaking, 
NGOs have advanced the debate by developing these types of indicators, but they still 
lack the physical infrastructure and capability to introduce complete management 
information systems in the running of their organisations. 
 
Staff development and external resources 
 
NGO staff need upgraded skills in some areas not only in order to implement 
management systems, as explained above, but also to undertake BDS projects 
successfully. The strategy developed by a number of NGOs is through strategic 
linkages with foreign and local institutions. Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka, developed 
associations with government, universities, and the private sector, as a means of 
informing their staff of the specifics of fish rearing and of the industry more widely, 
so as to provide improved services to their clientele. EWW in Zimbabwe gained 
significant knowledge from their interactions with foreign experts, as well as from the 
fact that the EWW programme was piloted abroad and successfully adapted to the 
domestic economy. The apparent lesson from these examples is that staff 
development does not need to be costly or dependent on subsidies – with mutually 
beneficial professional linkages, skill upgrading can be achieved at an affordable cost 
or even at no cost to NGOs. 
 
 
3.2.3  The private sector 
  
Donor- initiated programmes have also been implemented in partnership with private 
sector institutions. These can be foundations, chambers of commerce, business 
departments in private universities, and business associations. The main goal in these 
partnerships is to run BDS programmes with a strong business approach. Our two 
cases studies represent instances where the local institution was originally a private 
sector foundation (FSP, Senegal), or where the programme developed into an 
independent foundation (EMPRETEC, Ghana). Some key aspects of these 
organisational models deserve special attention. 
 
Promoting a business-like working culture 
 
One advantage of liaising with private sector institutions is that BDS programmes can 
be influenced by an existing businesslike working culture. This is reflected most 
clearly in the type of relationship that these BDS providers establish with their clients: 
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a relationship based around payment for services rather than free or subsidised 
provision of BDS. In Ghana, EMPRETEC follows a strategy of realistic market 
pricing of services, although it aims at modest profit margins. SMEs with growth 
potential and at the upper-end of the spectrum, for instance, pay full cost for suitable 
training products, while one-to-one services may not be fully paid for by poorer 
entrepreneurs. Other key aspects of its businesslike style are strong institutional 
capacity, growing financial autonomy, and the development of financially sustainable 
products, as described in Box 2 below. 
 
Box 2. EMPRETEC in Ghana 
 
EMPRETEC has progressed from a small start-up project in 1990 to an independent 
foundation today. Three core accomplishments characterise its recent performance: 
 
· The development of a strong institutional capacity: which is manifested in the 
high level of competencies among staff; the improving systems; the tangible sense 
of ownership and commitment within the organisation; and, overall, an extremely 
positive and businesslike working culture  
· The development of growing financial autonomy: one key dimension of 
institutional capacity is reducing the foundation’s dependence on external donor 
funding. Direct donor funding now accounts for less than two-thirds of overhead 
costs. 
· The development of financially sustainable products: The foundation increasingly seeks 
not only to cover direct costs but also to generate a contribution to overheads through its 
training products. 
 
Source: Adapted from Gibson (2000:61).   
 
 
The strategy taken by FSP-Senegal is not to deliver direct services from its own staff, 
but rather help to make expertise available to enterprises and business associations. 
This is done by FSP offering individual enterprises and groups of entrepreneurs 
access to local and foreign consultants through a system of accreditation: FSP selects 
service providers; gives accreditation to those above certain qualification 
requirements; and then draws up contracts with providers and clients. Serving as 
intermediary, FSP is hence able to reduce its own costs significantly. 
 
Demand-driven services but decreasing outreach    
   
The risk of providing services for which demand exists is that these BDS providers 
tend to serve the upper-end of SMEs. There is, therefore, an unintended move away 
from small enterprises, which results in decreased outreach to the target population. 
This potential problem is particularly acute in BDS providers with an independent 
perspective. Issues concerning lack of outreach are therefore fully analysed in the next 
section.   
 
 
3.3.  The Independent Approach 
 
The independent approach generally refers to public-private institutional 
arrangements where the primary objective is to help develop fully independent BDS 
providers in terms of legal status, financial sustainability and market-oriented 
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provision of services to their target clientele. Three types of models can be identified 
within this category: Business Centres, Clusters / Linkages, and Business Incubators.  
 
 
3.3.1  Business Centres 
 
The Business Centre model is neither service nor sector-specific. It seeks to develop 
institutions which could provide a wide range of business development services. For 
this purpose, linkages with local organisations are pursued in an ad-hoc basis, either to 
secure demand for BDS delivered by the Business Centre (e.g. links with sectoral 
associations), to hire consultants (e.g. links to universities, private training institutes), 
to seek funding (e.g. via local governments, chambers of commerce), or to refer to 
clients for useful information (e.g. from tax and other government agencies).  Case 
studies from the Philippines, Romania, Latin America, and Russia, help to illustrate 
the specific strengths and weaknesses of this model.  
 
Development of self-sufficient BDS providers 
 
A major strength of the model is its potential to develop financially sustainable BDS 
providers, as strong emphasis is placed on cost recovery, incentives and internal 
systems. All our case studies had start-up subsidies from international donors, but also 
included concrete measures to reduce support and promote self-sufficiency. 
Swisscontact in the Philippines, for instance, specify specific time and financial limits 
to its support to Business Centres i.e.: 3-5 years, and US$4,000-US$15,000 per year, 
together with exit provisions if contracts are violated (Gibson and Hitchins 2000:107). 
In the case of technical assistance it is more difficult to determine a time limit, but in 
order to increase accountability, Swisscontact is considering taking equity in business 
centres and thus providing technical advice as co-owner. 
 
In Romania, meanwhile, donors stipulate that business centres should become 
financially sustainable and find their own ways to attain this. Three strategies have 
hence been adopted: some centres became self-supporting from fees charged to clients 
and projects; others were supported by the local chambers of commerce (in cash and 
in kind); and yet others are becoming sustainable by increasing revenues through 
product diversification into non-business-related projects (Kennedy 2000:142-143). In 
Latin America, on the other hand, the strategy suggested by donors has been for 
centres to build up reserve funds named ‘sustainability funds’ (from clients’ fees and 
other incomes) in order gradually to become self-sufficient. One special feature of 
these centres is that they act as ‘service intermediaries’ between enterprises and 
external consultants that supply the service, and hence financial sustainability is 
expected to be attainable (García et al 2000). 
 
Financial sustainability is assisted by the capacity of business centres to focus on 
having the right personnel and management systems in place. Professionals with 
strong business instincts are favoured, preferably young and adaptable to the changing 
conditions of the entrepreneurial sector. Three types of management systems appear 
to be crucial to the approach of Business Centres: (1) Rigorous computerised systems 
of cost control and measurement; (2) Client information database to assess satisfaction 
with and demand for services; and (3) Performance-related remuneration and rewards 
to personnel, to stimulate institutional financial sustainability and client satisfaction.  
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Ownership 
 
Ownership is a critical issue in the Business Centre model, not only in the legal sense 
but also in the sense of commitment to the centre. Generally speaking, there are three 
main actors in a business centre with some claim to ownership: the operator, the 
manager, and the foreign donor. The operator is usually a local large organisation, 
such as a consulting firm, which becomes a partner of the foreign donor in order to 
initiate a business centre in the country. The manager or management team is the 
group of people responsible for running the business centre. The foreign donor could 
be a government or an NGO. One problem arising from international NGOs acting as 
foreign donors is that their legal status does not allow them to become shareholders in 
the business centre (as in the case of Swisscontact in the Philippines), and hence their 
power to demand high performance is somewhat constrained, despite the NGO’s high 
investment in the business centre. More generally, the degree to which ownership is 
present in the business centre depends on several factors: 
 
· Operator versus manager: In many cases, the legal owner of the business 
centre is the operator, whereas the manager is not legally an owner but is 
accountable for the running of the centre. This lack of legal ownership 
sometimes hampers commitment. 
· Foreign donors’ intervention: Donor advice in the running of business centres 
can sometimes be taken as top-down impositions, which can seriously 
undermine local ownership. This is particularly the case where external donors 
are not stakeholders in the centre (see Box 3). 
· Selection process: The type of selection process influences ownership. In cases 
where the selection of operators and managers have been through a detailed 
tendering procedure, ownership and accountability have been higher than 
when nomination has been based on friendship or informal contacts. 
· Size of local organisation: In order to develop its own identity and encourage 
ownership by all members involved, the business centre should not be too 
large in size nor be operated by a too large an organisation. 
 
 
Box 3. Ownership perils for business centres – The case of Swisscontact 
 
A number of incidents highlight some of the potential impacts from lack of clarity over ownership in 
the Swisscontact Business Centres. 
 
The split between ownership and management: One local businessperson initiated the Baguio SME 
business centre. An ex-president of the chamber of commerce, he is a dynamic and influential business 
leader and chairs the business centre. Unfortunately, he has lit tle time to devote to the management of 
the centre. Staff are quite junior and inexperienced, with little decision-making responsibility or 
capacity to innovate or deliver services. In the void between ownership and management, the business 
centre is sinking. 
 
Swisscontact (SC) interference into business centre ‘space’: two incidents between SC and the local 
business centre highlight potential problems when responsibilities are ill-defined and people feel 
unable to take responsibility over their business centre: 
 
· SC felt that the local business centre was drifting away from its target group: the business centre 
believes its main responsibility (not least to SC) was to ensure the financial sustainability of the 
organisation; focusing on clients that represent the strongest sources of revenue, was therefore –  
for the business centre – a valid strategy 
· The local business centre had received positive feedback from clients about their business plans 
and credit proposals – an important product for them. SC felt that the standard of these was 
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inadequate and that remedial action was needed. The local business centre management felt that 
they were not in control. 
 
Source: Extract from Gibson and Hitchins (2000). 
 
 
 
Conflict between financial sustainability and outreach 
 
The pressures to attain financial sustainability appears to reduce the outreach of 
business centres, i.e. their ability to provide for the target clientele, which are usually 
small enterprises. This is a particularly clear outcome in the business centres in 
Russia, where the move towards sustainability has reduced the outreach of business 
services, since the aim is now to focus on groups that are able to pay market-based 
rates. This means that business centres no longer provide support for: women 
entrepreneurs; young businessmen; micro-enterprises; SMEs that have serious 
financial problems and cannot pay for services; and business associations and NGOs 
(Astrakhan 1999). 
 
The apparent conflict between financial sustainability and outreach seems to represent 
a serious weakness in the Business Centres model – all our cases studies show lower 
outreach after cost-recovery measures have been firmly instituted in the centres. In 
Latin America, for instance, this limitation extends to the provision of services: 
dissemination and extension activities are likely to diminish because the cost of these 
services cannot be entirely absorbed by the firms, especially small ones (García 
2000:135). One option to overcome this problem is to group smaller firms together to 
create a collective demand wherein enterprises could share the cost of services – other 
factors such as organisational constraints may, however, limit the feasibility of this 
alternative.     
 
Balancing of financial sources 
 
In view of the potential negative effects of financial-sustainability goals, two possible 
options emerge from the literature: (1) Cross-subsidisation from remunerated and 
highly profitable activities to less lucrative ones, in order to cover the costs of those 
services that the target clientele cannot pay. The problem with this alternative is that it 
would be very difficult to undertake in countries with small BDS markets. (2) Mix of 
funding sources, from private and public sectors, in order to strike a balance between 
clients’ fees, income-generated activities, and other operations that require a degree of 
subsidy, especially to reach the smaller and poor enterprises which are excluded from 
commercial BDS providers. In this alternative, special institutional linkages also play 
a role in the increase of outreach. For example, contributions (in kind or cash) from 
private foundations, universities, and national non-governmental support 
organisations can greatly enhance the ability of business centres to provide for smaller 
firms.  
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3.3.2  Clusters and Linkages 
 
In contrast to the previous model, the Cluster approach is sector- and/or place-
specific. It refers to a concentration of enterprises that belong to the same industrial 
sector or are located in the same geographical area, which get together to co-operate 
on joint development projects, including efforts to gain access to BDS. Business 
Linkages, meanwhile, generally refer to vertical interactions between small and large 
enterprises in order to benefit from one another and improve access to BDS. The most 
outstanding examples of these models are the UNIDO programmes in Central 
America and India (see Table 1c). As with previous models, there are some 
advantages and disadvantages attached to the Clusters/Linkages approach. 
 
Fostering complementarities and co-operation 
   
Building on the premise that inter- firm cooperation does not always emerge 
spontaneously, UNIDO seeks to act as facilitator to the formation of clusters and aims 
at promoting complementarities (and specialisation) in order to overcome common 
problems and achieve collective efficiency far beyond their individual capabilities 
(Ceglie and Dini 1999). It is, in fact, an approach that involves the whole business 
system: enterprises (through the formation of clusters); their suppliers and buyers (by 
facilitating links with them); and support institutions (most relevantly, by helping 
BDS providers develop appropriate services for clusters’ members).  
 
There are four typical phases in the development of clusters: (1) the formation of 
clusters - when the creation of sufficient levels of mutual trust is paramount. To this 
end, an external agent – the cluster ‘broker’ – is trained by UNIDO to stimulate this 
process. Entrepreneurs are then exposed to intensive interactions which involves role 
assignment, criticisms based on the analysis of results; and reassignment of 
responsibilities; (2) restructuring at the firm level, which aims at adapting individual 
enterprises’ production and organisational capabilities to the needs of the common 
objectives of the cluster; (3) the improvement of the institutional environment, which 
includes upgrading the capacity of BDS suppliers for better provision of services to 
small enterprises; and (4) the enhancement of dialogue between private and public 
sectors, in order to promote a coordinated industrial policy in support of clusters and 
small enterprises. See also Box 4 for common elements of cluster development of the 
UNIDO programme. 
 
 
Box 4. UNIDO Cluster Development 
 
UNIDO is attempting to replicate the success of industry clusters from some Western 
countries with small enterprises in developing countries. This strategy is being implemented 
in Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Jamaica and India. Common elements among the 
programmes are: 
· Identification of the collective competitive advantage of each industry cluster and an 
overarching plan to build local capacity to realise this advantage. 
· Hiring of consultants, at cost to the project, to help small enterprises to form groups. The 
groups are trained and exposed to good practice in industry clusters. Clients pay a fee to 
join the groups and that fee contributes to the facilitator costs. 
· Identification of activities that will directly add value to businesses in the group and that 
the enterprises could not achieve independently. 
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· Linking groups to sources of BDS, rather than the programme providing BDS. 
· In some cases, initially helping suppliers respond to small enterprises’ demand by 
tailoring BDS products to the small enterprises’ groups. 
· Monitoring progress in terms of group activity as well as business growth. 
UNIDO has found that it is important to allow each group to follow its own path. UNIDO 
responds to groups’ requests, rather than directing the groups. UNIDO also found that 
suppliers were, in some cases, initially reluctant or incapable of providing tailored BDS to the 
groups – UNIDO hence decided to assist them with product development.  
 
Sources: Ceglie and Dini (1999), Russo et al (2000). 
 
A clear advantage of the cluster model is its ability to help entrepreneurs overcome 
market barriers, while supporting private sector BDS providers, i.e. in clusters, firms 
can gain access to BDS that would otherwise not be available to them individually; 
equally, by helping BDS suppliers develop specific services, the needs of clusters are 
better met.  
 
While UNIDO invests public resources to develop markets for BDS, the Business 
Linkages model seeks to foster a “win-win” relation in the private sector (Grierson et 
al 2000). By disseminating information about market players, this model helps 
develop small firm-large firm relationships that are beneficial for both, i.e. small 
enterprises gain access to BDS, larger firms benefit by building a customer base. In 
this model, external financial support is kept to a minimum, introduc ing market-based 
mechanisms as soon as mutual benefits are identified. 
 
The cost of organising groups 
 
A major challenge of the Cluster Model is the cost of forming and consolidating 
groups. Generally speaking, small enterprises do not perceive ‘organising groups’ as a 
service and hence are not willing to pay for it. As cooperation and joint action can be 
argued to have the qualities of a public good (i.e. once provided, they are freely 
available to all), the provision of subsidies by donors might be justified, as in the case 
of UNIDO (Russo et al 2000).  
 
However, there are cases in which BDS providers have managed to present group-
organising as a market building strategy for which enterprises would be willing to 
pay: in groups, enterprises can start selling their own products to other members, 
hence paying for group-organisation is actually a profitable investment (Field et al 
2000). Perhaps in the majority of cases, a mixture of public and private funding would 
be necessary, particularly for the initial phases of cluster development and in localities 
where private BDS suppliers are absent (Sandee and van Hulsen 2000). 
 
For Business Linkages, the driving force tends to be profit and therefore any initial 
subsidy is kept to a minimum. The strategy here is to identify opportunities for 
profitable business linkages, where large firms volunteer to work with small ones and 
expect commercial rewards, such as sub-contracting deals. 
 
Power imbalances 
 
Another important issue is the power imbalances that clusters and linkages can 
generate. For example, when a large buyer makes purchases from a small supplier, the 
buyer generally has overwhelming power to dictate the terms of contract. This can 
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result in exploitation of small suppliers. There are a number of possible techniques, 
however, which could help ameliorate the tendency towards power imbalances: 
 
· Diversification of buyers: The larger the number of buyers from one supplier, 
the less likely its dependence on one buyer. Clusters and Linkages should 
focus on securing large numbers of buyers and suppliers within the groups. 
· High ownership: At all levels of group interactions, awareness should be 
raised in order to involve members and local actors in contracts/projects 
design, and to encourage continuous feedback in implementation stages. 
· Enhance empowerment: Members and actors must have the leverage, 
credibility and resources to play their role. With these, their individual 
negotiating power would improve. 
· Good facilitating skills: To secure better communication and transmission of 
information, ‘brokers’ should possess excellent social skills and be properly 
trained in conflict-resolution techniques. 
· Appropriate costing and pricing: Assistance needs to be provided to small 
suppliers to establish reasonable and competitive prices when negotiating 
contracts with buyers. 
· Maintaining a bilateral relationship: Efforts to address power imbalances 
should make sure that the linkage remains bilateral between buyer and 
supplier, in order not to damage the model itself. 
· Right incentives: Incentives schemes for all actors must be put in place so that 
the financial and social performance of clusters and linkages should be 
achieved. For example, for ‘brokers’, an effective incentive has been training 
for professional advancement (Grierson et al 2000, Ceglie and Dini 2000). 
 
 
3.3.3  Business Incubators  
 
The model of Business Incubators aims at nurturing enterprises in the early stages of 
their development, in order to transform them into profitable businesses that would 
create jobs in local communities. Businesses are offered a working space and hence 
become ‘tenants’ of a Business Incubator; other BDS are also provided. After a period 
of approximately two years of incubation, businesses ‘graduate’ and are expected to 
survive and prosper in competitive local markets. Business Incubators first appeared 
in industrialised countries in the early 1980s; now their numbers are rapidly growing 
in several developing countries (see Box 5 for a few outstanding examples). 
 
Micro enterprise or ‘empowerment’ incubators have the added challenge of nurturing 
businesses in economically depressed regions, where local economies need 
invigorating and businesses require additional support services, as in our Russian case 
study. Gender empowerment in business ownership and strengthening minority-group 
participation are also important issues in these types of business incubators.  
 
 
Box 5.  Business Incubators in developing countries 
 
China: Among developing countries, the largest programme, with 100 incubators. From a modest 
beginning in the late 1980s with assistance from UNDP, the incubators have graduated over 200 
enterprises, expanding their contribution to economic restructuring. Difficulties have been encountered, 
such as insufficient assistance to tenant companies, low levels of local technological development, and 
weak incubator management. Incubators in China are generally non-profit, state-owned corporations, 
 25 
reporting to the provincial/municipal science and technology committees and local economic 
development zone. While the Ministry of Science and Technology’s TORCH programme provides 
policy guidelines, the management is left to the local agencies. Most entrepreneurs come from adjacent 
universities and technical institutes. The local government often offers free land to help to reduce 
capital costs, while flexibility in leasing for commercial purposes raises operating revenues. Eight 
incubators have been transformed into international business incubators, where small foreign high-tech 
companies will be facilitated to enter the complex Chinese market, while Chinese tenants are helped on 
joint venturing and exporting. 
Uzbekistan: As the government forces the pace of transforming its 70-year command system into a 
market economy, the business incubator programme is helping to overcome the hindrances encountered 
by self-owned businesses, including problems of cumbersome registration, high taxes, inadequate 
banking, materials procurement, and access to credit and business services. With political support at the 
highest level and initial UN assistance, three pilot incubators were started at Tashkent and Samarkand 
in mid-1995. Over 200 jobs have been created. In 1996 the Republic Business Incubator Network was 
initiated and has been expanded to 23 incubators serving 365 tenant businesses and creating 3,000 jobs, 
with a turnover of about US$5 million. The programme is also being used effectively to leverage small-
enterprise-friendly policies. Uzbekistan provides a good example of strong state support and effective 
donor intervention. 
South Africa: has had for many years a network of facilities called ‘hives of industry’, established by 
the Small Business Development Corporation. An incubator has now been started in Johannesburg by 
South African Breweries to help provide alternative livelihoods for their laid-off employees. The 
technology incubator at Technikon Natal, Durban will empower communities. State agencies - Ntsika 
and Khula – are establishing three local industrial parks comprising incubators and multi-tenant 
buildings. 
Malaysia : The large state investment of US$80 million in the Technology Park Malaysia near Kuala 
Lumpur has been ‘corporatised’. The core facility is an innovation-incubation-enterprise complex, with 
dominance in ICT. The integration of support facilities and a small in-house venture capital fund. A 
dozen incubation variants are operating in Malaysia, mainly linked to universities. 
Indonesia: Starting with UNDP assistance in 1994, three pilot incubators were established in Java: at 
Puspiptek tech-park, Serpong; a regional incubator at Solo; and an industrial incubator in Surabaya. By 
osmosis, seven more began, many as ‘out-wall incubators’ which also provided out-reach services to 
businesses in their own premises. Then, government decided to establish a major national programme, 
with many more incubators at universities in the out-lying islands.  
Egypt: The Social Fund for Development of the government of Egypt has initiated a network of 
incubators as a component of its extensive employment generation programmes. A business incubator 
at Tala in the Nile Delta started operations in March 1998 with 8 tenants, and another 8 being inducted. 
The Egyptian Incubator Association is undertaking the implementation – an NGO set up for this 
purpose. 
Source: Lalkaka and Shaffer (2000). 
 
 
Developing start-up small enterprises 
 
A major strength of Business Incubators is their focus on supporting start-up and 
young enterprises, and hence in helping to create new ventures. BDS that are provided 
to these enterprises include: working or production space, shared facilities (such as 
use of reception area, meeting rooms, parking, security, laboratories, equipment, 
telephone), counselling to raise confidence and reduce isolation, training in business 
plan development, techno logy sourcing, legal advice, marketing services, access to 
finance and external professional networks. In some cases, business incubators offer 
financial services directly. In Russia, for instance, incubation programmes offer the 
only credit available to small and start-up business: this is a leasing package whereby 
clients apply for equipment leasing, make regular interest payments while using the 
equipment, and, at the end of two years, become owners. This financial product has 
been beneficial to clients – who otherwise would not have had access to credit – and 
also to the Business Incubators which have an additional source of income (Schmertz 
2000: 246-247).   
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The complexity of clients’ needs call for special public-private partnerships in the 
provision of BDS. In the majority of incubation programmes, initial funding generally 
originates from foreign donors and gradually declines over a period of time. Local 
government subsidies complement these funds, usually in the form of free use of 
public buildings. Universities contribute with technical training and advice, while the 
private sector participates when it sees that the incubation programme could lead to 
greater business opportunities and promote spin-offs. In Brazil, Business Incubators 
have greatly benefited from a successful partnership with SEBRAE, the nationwide 
organisation that supports micro and small enterprises. SEBRAE not only provides 
specific BDS to incubators’ tenants, but also is member of the incubators’ governing 
board and hence advises on how to improve BDS and achieve financial sustainability.  
 
Identifying some good incubation practices 
 
Mian (1997) proposes a model for assessing the performance of some business 
incubators and identifies a number of indicators. Figure 3 presents these in a diagram, 
where at centre stage is the sponsor/manager of the incubator, together with linkages 
with private-public institutions, enterprises and markets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based partly on this analytical framework, some common good practices of Business 
Incubators have been found, particularly in relation to the Brazilian experience. 
 
· Identification of strong sponsors: Given the challenges of providing support 
for start-up and micro enterprises, strong and committed sponsors are 
fundamental to the effective functioning of incubators. In a recent survey in 
Brazil, relations with local governments, universities and the private sector 
were deemed highly cooperative – these partners are a mixture of experienced 
national organisations, such as SEBRAE, and private ins titutions with clear 
vision on how to develop business sustainably (Lalkaka and Shaffer 2000). 
· Selecting good locations and planning functional buildings: It is advisable that 
the business infrastructure is in close proximity to knowledge centres such as 
universities, research institutes and private training facilities. 
Gov Federal/ 
state/city
Culture/ Skills 
Entrepreneur
University Research 
Institute
National/ export 
market, workforce
Figure 3. Linkages and impacts of Business Incubators
Source: Adapted from Mian (1997)
Sponsors/manager 
incubator
Community Private 
sector
State finance 
Bank/venture capital
EnterprisesEntrepreneur
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· Forming well-trained management team: Well-performing personnel are 
critical to success. Building individual capabilities of employees and managers 
and introducing result-dependent incentives are considered important elements 
to improve such staff performance. 
· Selecting clients with good potential: Well-motivated clientele are likely to 
progress during incubation and fulfil their potential. Good practice calls for 
transparent selection processes, flexible means for graduation, and appropriate 
pre- and post-incubation support. 
· Providing quality services: A mixture of services, such as those related to skill 
development and the provision of physical and financial support, is likely to 
create synergies between products and, hence, add value to clients’ original 
capabilities and resources. 
· Monitoring performance and assessing impacts: Internal management systems 
which are clear, simple and inexpensive, are fundamental to keeping track of 
progress and helping make timely policy decisions.   
 
 
Challenging macro-environments 
 
Despite emerging good practices, the macro environment in which business 
incubators – and other institutional arrangements – operate remains a serious 
challenge. Even in the case of Brazil, incubators began to expand only after the 
country’s economic situation stabilised after 1993 (almost a decade after these 
programmes started). The regulatory framework could also be an important hindrance, 
as well as the lack of appropriate transport and communications infrastructure.  
 
These obstacles are particularly severe in Russia, where the Volkhov Business 
Incubators (VBI) operate. In 1995, when these programmes began, the city of 
Volkhov was extremely depressed: large and small enterprises were shut down, no 
new businesses were being created, no municipal services were being upgraded, there 
was no e-mail, no business services, no access to credit, and, although there were few 
computers, training for learning how to use them was lacking. In addition, Russian 
government support for private, small enterprises has been non-existent. On the 
contrary, small businesses are heavily burdened by taxes and licence fees, which also 
involve bribery or direct extortion. Moreover, criminal groups demand money – and 
in larger amounts than tax inspectors’ bribes – from small enterprises.       
 
In this very challenging environment, the approach adopted for the development of 
Business Incubators in Volkhov has been quite successful in several respects. It is a 
private non-profit organisation supported by USAID (for the initial 3 years only) with 
a clear business-oriented vision. Staff have been carefully selected and rewarded for 
honesty as well as good performance; and VBI’s reputation of being a respectable 
institution has been carefully guarded. Today, VBIs are regarded as valuable 
contributors to the development of small businesses in provincial towns, and are 
becoming self-sustaining.  
 
Whilst the depressed state of the Russian economy can present constraints, it also 
means that market opportunities are often very considerable – VBIs have capitalised 
on this with a market-driven approach that is helping them to attain financial 
sustainability. Other achievements are: (1) an institution has been modelled on the 
incubator, and named “Non-commercial Business Partnership”, which is the first 
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independent, voluntary association established in Volkhov; (2) VBIs have lobbied 
successfully to reduce transport- leasing taxes in the province; (3) the first credit union 
in the region is being established with the support of VBIs; and (4) the Russian 
National Association of Business Incubators has been created to replicate incubators 
in the country at large (Schmertz 2000).    
 
 
Section 4. Conclusions: emerging guidelines for BDS delivery 
 
This paper has reviewed three distinct institutional approaches to the delivery of 
business development services: the government-driven approach, donor partnership 
with national institutions, and the independent perspective. Drawing on worldwide 
experience, the paper identifies important advantages and disadvantages in 
implementing each of these models, which ultimately depends on the specific context 
and local institutional aims. In these concluding remarks, we summarise some of the 
emerging general guidelines to BDS providers on how to improve the provision of 
services, particularly to small enterprises at local levels. 
 
One crucial first step is to assess the local market accurately. This means gaining an 
in-depth knowledge of the demand for BDS at various levels: national, regional, 
provincial and village. Similarly, the supply of BDS needs to be clearly understood, 
including the types of formal and informal providers. Once the nature of market 
failure is recognised, interventions to help develop BDS provision can add value and 
facilitate market enhancement. A second fundamental step is to determine the key aim 
of the intervention, which could be to provide BDS widely, or alternatively to focus 
on small and micro-enterprises in isolated areas. Most importantly, it is vital to 
establish whether the primary aim is to help alleviate poverty, develop businesses, or 
become institutionally self-sufficient, as there are trade-offs between these different 
objectives.  Hence, decisions on implementing one type of institutional objective 
rather than another needs careful consideration. 
     
Although specific approaches possess particular strengths and weaknesses, some 
general strategies that can be applicable to all are currently emerging (Gibson 1997, 
Steel et al 2000, Miehlbradt 2002):   
 
· Demand-driven products: An important challenge for BDS providers, 
especially for serving small, poor enterprises at local levels, is to develop low-
cost products suited to their clientele’ needs. This strategy helps attain the goal 
of supporting small enterprises and, if products are profitable, it could also 
help the institution to work towards financial sustainability. 
 
· Forging institutional linkages: Given the diversity of small enterprise clients 
and local contexts, no single type of delivery model fits all. Different types of 
BDS providers in various institutional arrangements can complement one 
another, the better to provide for the target population. Forging linkages 
between institutions and approaches, depending on context, can lead to greater 
gains. 
 
· Efficient internal systems: In order to improve impact of BDS on clientele and 
attain self-sufficiency, internal institutional systems need to be in place. This 
includes proper collection of information and measurement of key indicators, 
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which would inform policy decisions, levels of client satisfaction, product 
design, organisational performance, and financial sustainability. 
 
· Staff development: Having a highly motivated and professional staff is crucial 
for the effectiveness of BDS provision. To this end, practical and topic-
specific training courses as well as well-designed performance incentives help 
raise staff capabilities and modify behaviour, contributing towards the 
accomplishment of organisational objectives. 
 
Finally, the role of governments in these strategies is to provide an underpinning in 
the shape of infrastructure and education. For instance, governments can: help ensure 
that the legal and judicial system supports low-cost contract enforcement; facilitate 
the flow of market information through data collection and effective communication 
systems; and make transport, electricity, water and other infrastructure systems widely 
available in order to help support small enterprises and BDS providers.  
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